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Abstract
This paper considers a market with an incumbent monopolistic firm and a potential
entrant. Production by both firms causes polluting emissions. The government selects
a tax per unit emission by maximizing social welfare. The size of the tax rate affects
whether or not the potential entrant enters the market. We identify the conditions that
create a market structure where the preferences of the government and the incumbent
firm coincide. Interestingly, there are cases where both the government and incumbent
firm prefer a monopoly. Hence, the government might induce profitable monopolization
by using a socially optimal tax policy instrument.
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1 Introduction
Over the last couple of decades environmental policy has become a major device in address-
ing and shaping industries’ use of environmental and natural resources. In this respect, two
important issues come forward: (i) the (optimal) relationship between environmental policy
and market structure, i.e. the number of firms within a market (e.g., Buchanan 1969; Barnett
1980; Misiolek 1980; Baumol and Oates 1988; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 1995)1, and (ii)
who the winners and losers of environmental policy are (e.g., Jordan 1972; Buchanan and
Tullock 1975; Maloney and McCormick 1982).2 Environmental policy can be implemented in
two ways, i.e. either by market-based instruments, like emission or eﬄuent taxes, or by im-
posing direct command-and-control measures, like emission quotas or standards. Regarding
issue (i), it is well known that taxes are superior to control measures in terms of achieving ef-
ficiency in pollution control activities. However, taxes might not be the preferred instrument
when addressing issue (ii).
In their seminal article, Buchanan and Tullock (1975) compare eﬄuent taxes and quotas
and argue that regulated industries tend to prefer quotas to eﬄuent charges, since the former
create a higher degree of “industry cartelization” (or “monopolization”) and as such would
yield higher industry profit. Dewees (1983) has also demonstrated that existing firms may
prefer standards to market-based policies, such as taxes. The idea is that incumbent firms
are not necessarily harmed by imposed environmental policy but can gain an advantage out
of it. For instance, in a positive theoretical setting Maloney and McCormick (1982) show
that environmental control measures may deliver rents to regulated firms. That is, the active
pursuit by incumbent firms for more stringent regulation can be used as a strategic tool to
“raising rivals’ costs” (e.g., Salop and Scheffman 1983; Simpson 1995).3 By raising the costs
as induced by regulatory controls, output is reduced and prices subsequently tend to increase,
which can generate higher profits in case entry is restricted. The theoretical prediction that
environmental controls can act as an entry deterrence device has recently also found empirical
1See also Lee (1975), Conrad and Wang (1993), Shaffer (1995), Simpson (1995), Lee (1999) for theoretical
contributions, and OECD (1995) for a general discussion of issue (i).
2See Pearson (1995) for a practical discussion of this issue and Farzin (2003, 2004) for a theoretical coverage
of both issue (i) and (ii).
3Puller (2006) provides a recent study on how firms in a concentrated industry have an incentive to innovate
so as to intensify the pursuit for more stringent environmental regulation in order to raise their rivals’ costs.
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support by the study of Helland and Matsuno (2003). They particularly find that larger firms
may benefit from increased compliance costs. Thus, the above suggests that environmental
control measures could lead to industry cartelization.
Given this important policy effect on industry structure and firm performance, our paper
adds to the above literature by focusing specifically on environmental taxes. The aim is to
examine under which conditions such taxes may create both a beneficial market outcome to
the regulated industry and a beneficial welfare outcome to the government, where welfare
includes an environmental quality argument. That is, we identify the conditions that create
a market structure where the preferences of the government and the incumbent firm coincide,
which implies a lower degree of competition in the market.
In a well-known article, Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas (1995) look at the effect of an
eﬄuent tax on the number of firms in an oligopolistic market setting. In the first stage of the
game the government sets the (welfare-maximizing) tax rate. In the second stage, all firms
decide whether or not to enter the industry, which is subsequently followed by competition
in the output market. Shaffer (1995) and Lee (1999) do a similar exercise but then with an
output tax instead of an eﬄuent tax. The main difference with the aforementioned literature
is that we address a market structure in which an incumbent firm is already active in the
output market, whereas the previous literature considers the situation that all firms have to
decide whether or not to enter the industry before they start producing. We believe that
our setting is more appropriate in those cases where a government introduces environmental
taxes in a market that already exists. Moreover, it enables us to examine whether or not an
existing firm will benefit from environmental taxes.
Our model considers a market for a homogeneous good with an incumbent monopolistic
firm and a potential entrant, where production by both firms causes polluting emissions
(environmental wastes or eﬄuents). The government selects a tax per unit of emission by
maximizing social welfare. Social welfare also takes into account the social damage caused
by the aggregate industry pollution. The magnitude of the emission tax affects the potential
entrant’s decision whether or not to enter the market. In particular, we investigate the
following three-stage game. In the first stage, the emission tax is chosen by the government.
In the second stage, the potential entrant decides whether or not it will enter the market.
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Finally, given the decision of the potential entrant in the second stage, either the incumbent
firm supplies the monopoly output level in case entry did not occur or both firms compete in
outputs in case of entry.
Interestingly, we show that there are cases where both the government and the incumbent
firm prefer to establish the low monopoly output by introducing a relatively high emission tax.
In that case, the government deliberately induces profitable monopolization of the market.
Hence, in contrast to the aforementioned finding of Buchanan and Tullock (1975), we show
that a market-based instrument in the form of environmental taxes can also effectively lead
to monopolization of the market. From the industry perspective, the incumbent firm may
prefer a high emission tax if it creates an entry barrier, hence providing more leeway to
reap the fruits (higher profit) from a higher degree of industry concentration. Moreover, the
government may as well prefer less competition because this could cause less damage to the
environment, which has a positive effect on social welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 presents the
results derived from the model. Section 4 gives a numerical illustration. We conclude in
Section 5. Proofs and technical details are given in the Appendix.
2 The model
Take a market with an incumbent firm (firm 1) and a potential entrant (firm 2). Both firms
supply a homogeneous product. The inverse demand function is p = a− bQ, where p denotes
the price, Q = q1 + q2 is output, and a, b > 0 are constants. Firm 2 incurs a fixed entry cost
F > 0. Production costs of both firms are normalized to zero. Production of one unit of
output causes e > 0 units of polluting emissions. The government imposes a tax τ ≥ 0 per
unit of emission. The tax rate is set by maximizing social welfare W , comprising producer
surplus (aggregate profits net of taxes) PS, consumer surplus CS, aggregate tax revenues T ,
and the social valuation of environmental damage caused by aggregate pollution D:
W = PS + CS + T −D. (1)
We write T = τeQ and D = λeQ, with λ > 0 denoting the marginal social damage of
environmental pollution (see also Moraga-Gonza´lez and Padro´n-Fumero 2002).
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We employ a three-stage game to analyze the impact of environmental taxation on social
welfare and its subsequent effect on the market structure. In stage 1 the government selects
the emission tax rate τ , in stage 2 firm 2 decides whether or not to enter and in stage 3 there is
Cournot competition (if firm 2 decides to enter) or monopoly (if firm 2 decides not to enter).
As usual in such a setting, the model is solved for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.
We impose the following assumption on the parameters of the model:
Assumption 1 There holds λmin < λ < λmax, with λmin ≡ a3e and λmax ≡ a−2
√
bF
e .
If Assumption 1 does not hold, then either λ is so small that the government does not tax
pollution at all in a duopoly, or λ is so large that the tax rate set by the government always
precludes entry by firm 2. Clearly, these extreme cases are less interesting. Finally, remark
that λmin < λmax implies that F < Fmax, with Fmax ≡ a29b . Hence, given a and b, the fixed
entry cost must be small enough.
3 Results and discussion
We derive the equilibrium using backward induction. In the third stage the tax rate τ is given
and two market cases need to be considered: monopoly and duopoly. It is straightforward to
derive the first-order conditions and the equilibrium values for output, price and profit under
both market configurations. The equilibrium values are given in Table 1. To ensure outputs
are positive, we need a− τe > 0. It turns out that this holds in equilibrium.
In the second stage (again τ given) the entry decision of firm 2 is considered. Firm 2 enters
the market if and only if its gross profit exceeds the fixed entry cost, i.e. if (a−τe)
2
9b − F > 0.
Solving (a−τe)
2
9b = F , while focusing on the case with a− τe > 0, one obtains:
τ = τ ≡ a− 3
√
bF
e
. (2)
Remark that τ > 0 if F < a
2
9b , which is true as a result of Assumption 1. Furthermore, as
expected, τ is a decreasing function of F . We now obtain:
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Let the tax rate τ be given (with a− τe > 0). Then
firm 2 will enter the market if τ < τ ; it will decide not to enter the market if τ ≥ τ .
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Table 1: Equilibrium monopoly and duopoly values.
Monopoly Duopoly
Output qm = Qm = a−τe2b q
d
1 = q
d
2 =
a−τe
3b
Qd = 2(a−τe)3b
Price pm = a+τe2 p
d = a+2τe3
Profit pim = (a−τe)
2
4b pi
d
1 =
(a−τe)2
9b
pid2 =
(a−τe)2
9b − F
Notice that firm 2 will enter in case the government does not impose an emission tax.
Finally, in the first stage the governmental authority selects the tax rate τ , given the
degree of pollution e. Let us first find the optimal tax rate given that firm 2 decides to enter.
Then in the duopoly social welfare reduces to (see Appendix):
W d =
4(a− τe)2
9b
+
2(a− τe)
3b
(τ − λ)e− F. (3)
The government maximizes social welfare (3) under the constraint that firm 2 does enter, i.e.
τ < τ . Solving dW d/dτ = 0 yields:
τd =
3λ
2
− a
2e
. (4)
Using Assumption 1 it follows that 0 < τd < τ . Hence, τd is the welfare-maximizing tax
rate in the duopoly case. As expected, this optimal tax rate is increasing in the marginal
social damage of pollution, λ. The tax rate is independent of F since the government now
accommodates entry of firm 2 and the output decision of this firm is not affected by the
fixed entry cost. We further notice that Assumption 1 implies that a− τde > 0, i.e. duopoly
outputs are indeed positive.
Using the tax rate (4), the term a−τde straightforwardly reduces to 32(a−λe). Subsequent
substitution of this expression into (3) generates the following simplified expression of social
welfare under duopoly with the optimal tax rule (see Appendix):
W d =
(a− λe)2
2b
− F. (5)
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Let us now consider the case where firm 2 decides not to enter. Social welfare then
represents welfare under the monopoly structure, Wm:
Wm =
3(a− τe)2
8b
+
(a− τe)
2b
(τ − λ)e. (6)
The government maximizes social welfare (6) under the constraint that firm 2 does not enter,
i.e. τ ≥ τ . Solving dWm/dτ = 0, we find the solution:
τˆ = 2λ− a
e
. (7)
However, comparing the monopoly tax rate (7) with the optimal tax rate (4) set under a
duopoly structure, it is easily seen that τˆ < τd < τ , which, using Lemma 1, contradicts the
assumption that firm 2 will not enter in this case. Hence, the constraint is binding and the
government sets the tax rate τ = τm ≡ τ . Using this, social welfare in the monopoly case
becomes (see Appendix):
Wm =
3
2
√
F
b
(a− λe)− 9F
8
. (8)
Remark that also here a− τme > 0, i.e. monopoly output is indeed positive.
For later use it is interesting to compare, while using the optimal tax rates, the profit
level of firm 1 in case firm 2 does not enter with the profit level of firm 1 if firm 2 decides to
enter. These profits are given by, respectively:
pim =
(a− τme)2
4b
=
9F
4
, (9)
and
pid1 =
(a− τde)2
9b
=
(a− λe)2
4b
. (10)
This leads us to the following result:
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, under the optimal tax rules, the monopoly
profit of firm 1 is larger than its duopoly profit, i.e. pim > pid1, if and only if λ > max{λ1, λmin},
with λ1 ≡ a−3
√
bF
e .
Proof. In Appendix.
It can be verified that 0 < λ1 < λmax. However, λ1 can be smaller or larger than λmin.
We can solve for stage 1 by comparing social welfare with and without entry of firm 2.
We derive the following result for the equilibrium decision of the government.
7
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then in equilibrium the government selects τ =
τm ≡ τ if and only if λ > max{λ2, λmin}, with λ2 ≡ a−(
3
2
+
√
2)
√
bF
e . The government selects
τ = τd otherwise.
Proof. In Appendix.
We observe that 0 < λ1 < λ2 < λmax, and that λ2 can be smaller or larger than λmin.
Combining the above Lemmas, we present our main proposition.
Proposition 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Define F1 ≡ 4a281b and F2 ≡ 16a
2
9(3+2
√
2)2b
(with
0 < F1 < F2 < Fmax) and take λ1 and λ2 as defined in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. We then
have the following in equilibrium for different values of F ∈ (0, Fmax) and λ ∈ (λmin, λmax):
– Case (a): Let 0 < F < F1. Then λmin < λ1 < λ2 < λmax, and
(i) λmin < λ < λ1 ⇒ τ = τd and pid1 > pim,
(ii) λ1 < λ < λ2 ⇒ τ = τd and pim > pid1,
(iii) λ2 < λ < λmax ⇒ τ = τm and pim > pid1.
– Case (b): Let F1 < F < F2. Then λ1 < λmin < λ2 < λmax, and
(iv) λmin < λ < λ2 ⇒ τ = τd and pim > pid1,
(v) λ2 < λ < λmax ⇒ τ = τm and pim > pid1.
– Case (c): Let F2 < F < Fmax. Then λ1 < λ2 < λmin < λmax, and
(vi) λmin < λ < λmax ⇒ τ = τm and pim > pid1.
Proof. In Appendix.
To discuss Proposition 1, let us first develop some intuition. It can be verified that entry
of firm 2 always leads to a lower price and higher industry output, resulting in a higher
summation of (gross) profits, consumer surplus and tax revenues compared to the monopoly
case. This has a positive effect on social welfare. On the other hand, both the fixed entry
fee and higher aggregate environmental pollution adversely affect social welfare. Yet, if we
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take the extreme case where F and λ are small, these negative effects are less important
and the government prefers duopoly, i.e. it sets τ = τd. Next, take the other extreme case
where both F and λ are large. In that case, the adverse effects of the fixed entry fee and
higher aggregate environmental pollution will dominate the positive effects of entry by firm
2, and the government will prefer monopoly, i.e. it sets τ = τm. This intuition explains what
happens with the tax rate set by the government if we compare cases (i)—(vi) of Proposition 1
for gradually increasing values of F and/or λ.
Let us now focus on the effects of changes in F and λ on the profit of firm 1. Clearly, if
we would have the same tax rate in monopoly and duopoly, firm 1 would prefer monopoly
since then it faces no competition and can keep its higher monopoly profit. However, in our
model, the tax rate in monopoly is larger than the tax rate in duopoly, i.e. τm > τd. Further,
if F and/or λ become smaller, the difference between τm and τd becomes larger. In that
case it might happen that the difference between the tax rates becomes so large, that firm 1
prefers duopoly with its relatively much smaller tax rate. This explains what happens with
the profit of firm 1 in cases (i)—(vi) of Proposition 1 for different values of F and/or λ.
Next, let us examine the interest of the government jointly with the interest of the in-
cumbent firm. We make three observations. First, we have identified the conditions where
the governmental and firm 1’s interests coincide in the sense of deterring entry of firm 2.
These conditions are given by cases (iii), (v) and (vi) of Proposition 1, where the govern-
ment prefers monopoly above duopoly and imposes a correspondingly high tax rate. This
discourages entry of firm 2, which is profitable to firm 1, and a low monopoly output level
can be established. Second, there are also situations where the interests of the government
and firm 1 do not coincide. They are given by cases (ii) and (iv) of Proposition 1. Here the
government prefers duopoly with its positive effects on social welfare, whereas firm 1 prefers
monopoly, even though the tax rate would be higher in that case. Third, in case (i) the
interests of the government and firm 1 coincide again, but now in the sense that both prefer
duopoly. Given our discussion above the reason for this coincidence of interests is clear, i.e.
F and λ are small in this case.
We notice that in order to simplify the presentation, we have not considered in Proposi-
tion 1 the cases where F = F1, F = F2, λ = λ1 or λ = λ2. The results for those cases are
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Table 2: Outcomes for different values of λ with a = 10, b = 2, e = 3 and F = 2.
λ Wm W d pim pid1 pi
d
2 D
m Dd τm τd
1.30 6.90 7.30 4.50 4.65 2.65 5.85 11.90 1.33 0.28
1.35 6.67 6.85 4.50 4.43 2.43 6.08 12.05 1.33 0.36
1.40 6.45 6.41 4.50 4.21 2.21 6.30 12.18 1.33 0.43
obvious and less interesting, and can be left to the reader.
Concluding this section, we recall that it is common practice in the literature to compare
the size of the emission tax rate with the marginal social damage caused by pollution (see
e.g., Barnett 1980; Katsoulacos and Xepapadeas 1995). Using (4), we see that τd < λ if and
only if λ < a/e, which is always true given Assumption 1. Intuitively, the government sets τd
smaller than λ in order to mitigate the distortion that exists due to imperfect competition
(market power) in the duopolistic output market (cf. the aforementioned references). Turning
to τm, equation (7) yields that τm < λ if and only if a − 3√bF < λe. Substituting F = 0
and invoking Assumption 1, we see that this inequality does not hold. On the contrary, if
F = Fmax, then the inequality is true. Hence, there exists a threshold Fˆ (λ) such that τm < λ
if and only if F ∈ (Fˆ (λ), Fmax). Intuitively, if F is small, i.e. if F ∈ (0, Fˆ (λ)), then the
government sets a high tax rate in order to deter entry by firm 2, i.e. τm > λ. However, if F
is large, i.e. if F ∈ (Fˆ (λ), Fmax), then entry is already deterred for small tax rates and the
government again tries to mitigate the output distortion on the monopolistic output market,
i.e. τm < λ.
4 An illustration
In order to give an illustration of the functional behavior of Proposition 1, let us fix some
parameters and consider the situation where a = 10, b = 2, e = 3 and F = 2. As a result
one obtains λmin = 1.11, λmax = 2.00, Fmax = 5.56, λ1 = 1.33, λ2 = 1.39, F1 = 2.47
and F2 = 2.62. Notice that the fixed entry cost F = 2 implies that we are in case (a) of
Proposition 1. For this case we take three different values of λ, which correspond to situations
(i), (ii) and (iii) of Proposition 1 respectively. Table 2 contains the numerical outcomes of
this specific example.
Comparison of the monopoly welfare (Wm) with duopoly welfare (W d), and monopoly
profit (pim) with the profit of firm 1 in case of duopoly (pid1), shows that the results correspond
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to Proposition 1. The Table also presents for each value of λ the corresponding duopoly profit
of firm 2 (pid2), the social valuation of environmental damage under monopoly (D
m = λeQm)
and under duopoly (Dd = λeQd), and the monopoly and duopoly tax rates (τm and τd,
respectively). Figures 1 and 2 below extend and complement Table 2 by showing how welfare
(Figure 1) and profit of firm 1 (Figure 2) change as a function of F ∈ [1.95, 2.05] and
λ ∈ [1.30, 1.40].
Figure 1: Monopoly and duopoly welfare as function of F and λ. The surface that hits the
left front vertical axis above corresponds to duopoly welfare.
The impact of changes in F and λ on social welfare corresponds to the intuition. Recall
that welfare under monopoly and duopoly are given by (8) and (5) respectively. In Figure
1 we see that welfare in the duopolistic market strictly decreases with F , which is relatively
small in this specific example given the indicated range of parameter values. The influence of
λ shows a stronger effect under duopolistic competition compared to the monopoly case. The
reason here is that due to competition, output under duopoly is higher relative to the level of
output under monopoly, and so the social valuation of environmental damage in the duopoly
market is also higher than would be under monopoly, causing a stronger effect on duopoly
welfare. Although welfare decreases at a faster rate under duopoly than under monopoly,
Figure 1 also indicates that beyond a certain threshold value for λ monopoly welfare is higher
than duopoly welfare.
The same rationale applies to the profit of firm 1 as presented in Figure 2. It indeed
shows that the monopoly profit given by (9) is independent of λ but strictly increasing in
F , whereas the duopoly profit given by (10) is independent of F but decreasing in λ. At a
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Figure 2: Monopoly and duopoly profit of firm 1 as function of F and λ. The surface that
hits the left front vertical axis above corresponds to duopoly profit.
certain threshold value for λ profit under monopoly becomes higher than under duopoly.
5 Conclusions
It is known from the literature that direct environmental control measures, such as output
quota of polluting products, might lead to monopolization or “cartelization” of markets,
which is welcomed by the incumbent firm(s). This paper, instead, investigates this issue
in terms of the use of a market-based environmental policy instrument, in particular an
emission tax. We employ a three-stage game to identify the market conditions under which
a government’s preference and the preference of an incumbent monopolistic firm coincide in
case of environmental taxation. Key in our analysis is to what extent the optimal tax rate set
by the government affects the degree of competition, and subsequently the level of output.
The incumbent firm might prefer a high emission tax if this discourages a potential rival to
enter the market, which ensures the monopoly profit for the incumbent. The government
might prefer such a high tax because of its discouraging effect on competition, hence keeping
a monopoly in place, and implying less environmental damage. Depending on the marginal
social damage of environmental pollution and the fixed entry cost of the potential entrant,
less competition could imply higher overall welfare. In sum, a market-based social-welfare
maximizing environmental tax instrument can also induce profitable monopolization of a
market.
12
Appendix: Proofs and technical details
Derivation of social welfare function (3) under duopoly Producer surplus under a
duopoly is just the sum of pid1 and pi
d
2. Taking the expressions from Table 1 yields
2(a−τe)2
9b −F.
Consumer surplus reads:
CS =
1
2
Qd(a− pd)
=
1
2
2 (a− τe)
3b
(
a− a+ 2τe
3
)
=
2 (a− τe)2
9b
.
The aggregate tax revenues minus the social valuation of environmental damage becomes:
T −D = Qd(τ − λ)e
=
2 (a− τe)
3b
(τ − λ)e.
Finally, combining the welfare terms according to (1) yields (3). 
Derivation of social welfare function (5) under duopoly given optimal tax rule
Using the optimal duopoly tax rate τ = τd = 3λ2 − a2e , the term 32(a−λe) can straightforwardly
be written as 32(a − λe). Substitution of the latter into the social welfare function (3) then
yields:
W d(τd) =
4
9b
· 9
4
(a− λe)2 + 2
3b
· 3
2
(a− λe)
(
3λe
2
− a
2
− λe
)
− F
=
(a− λe)2
b
+
(a− λe)
b
· (λe− a)
2
− F
=
(a− λe)2
2b
− F.
We have found (5). 
Derivation of social welfare function (8) under monopoly given optimal tax rule
Using the optimal monopoly tax rate τ = τm = a−3
√
bF
e and substituting this into (6) yields
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the social welfare function according to:
Wm(τm) =
3
8b
· (9bF ) + 3
√
bF
2b
(
a− 3
√
bF − λe
)
=
27F
8
+
3
2
√
F
b
(a− λe)− 9F
2
=
3
2
√
F
b
(a− λe)− 9F
8
.
We have derived (8). 
Proof of Lemma 2 Using (9) and (10), and invoking Assumption 1, one can verify that
pim = pid1 if λ = λ1 ≡ a−3
√
bF
e . Together with Assumption 1 this gives Lemma 2. 
Proof of Lemma 3 First, using (5) and (8) we have:
W d < Wm ⇐⇒
(a− λe)2
2b
− F < 3
2
√
F
b
(a− λe)− 9F
8
⇐⇒
(a− λe)2
2b
+
F
8
<
3
2
√
F
b
(a− λe)⇐⇒
(a− λe)2 + bF
4
< 3 (a− λe)
√
bF . (1)
Next, introducing the auxiliary variable x ≡ a− λe, we can rewrite (1) as:
x2 − 3x
√
bF +
bF
4
< 0.
The roots of x2−3x√bF+ bF4 = 0 are equal to x1,2 = (32±
√
2)
√
bF . Noting that Assumption 1
implies that x > 2
√
bF , we see that the relevant root is x1 = (32 +
√
2)
√
bF . Hence, (1) is
fulfilled for 2
√
bF < x < x1. Defining λ2 ≡ a−x1e , and using Assumption 1, we obtain
Lemma 3. 
Proof of Proposition 1 Observe that λmin < λ1, or a3e <
a−3√bF
e , can be rewritten
as F < 4a
2
81b (≈ 0.0494a
2
b ). Next, λmin < λ2, or
a
3e <
a−( 3
2
+
√
2)
√
bF
e , can be rearranged as
F < 16a
2
9(3+2
√
2)2b
(≈ 0.0523a2b ). Combining this with Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 yields Proposition 1.

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